Search results for "entry preemption"

showing 3 items of 3 documents

Stackelberg equilibrium with many leaders and followers. The case of zero fixed costs

2017

Abstract I study a version of the Stackelberg game with many identical firms in which leaders and followers use a continuous cost function with no fixed cost. Using lattice theoretical methods I provide a set of conditions that guarantee that the game has an equilibrium in pure strategies. With convex costs the model shows the same properties as a quasi-competitive Cournot model. The same happens with concave costs, but only when the number of followers is small. When this number is large the leaders preempt entry. I study the comparative statics and the limit behavior of the equilibrium and I show how the main determinants of market structure interact. More competition between the leaders …

Stackelberg equilibriumEconomics and EconometricsComparative staticsSupermodular gameEndogenous market structures05 social sciencesExistence of the equilibriumCournot competitionEntry preemptionSettore SECS-P/06 - Economia ApplicataCournot equilibriumMicroeconomicsMarket structure0502 economics and businessTheoretical methodsStackelberg competitionEconomics050207 economicsSettore SECS-P/01 - Economia PoliticaConvex functionFixed costMathematical economics050205 econometrics Research in Economics
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ENDOGENOUS TIMING WITH FREE ENTRY

2006

A free entry model with linear costs is considered where firms first choose their entry time and then compete in the market according to the resulting timing decisions. Multiple equilibria arise allowing for infinitely many industry output configurations encompassing one limit-output dominant firm and the Cournot equilibrium with free entry as extreme cases. Sequential entry is never observed. Both Stackelberg and Cournot-like outcomes are sustainable as equilibria however. When the number of incumbents is given, entry is always prevented, and industry output is sometimes larger than the entry preventing level.

Entry preventionEntry timeCournot competitionSettore SECS-P/06 - Economia ApplicataMarket leadershipjel:L11Microeconomicsfree entry market leadership entry preventionFree entryjel:L13EconomicsStackelberg competitionmedicineFree entrymedicine.symptomEndogenous Timing Entry PreemptionIndustrial organization
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Endogenous timing with infinitely many firms

2008

Abstract A model with constant marginal costs is considered where firms choose first a period for production and then the amount to produce when competing in the market according to the resulting timing decisions. Multiple equilibria arise allowing for infinitely many industry output configurations encompassing one limit-output dominant firm and the Cournot equilibrium with free entry as extreme cases. At each of these equilibria a firm produces a positive amount only if this firm commits to produce at period one. Both Stackelberg and Cournot-like outcomes are sustainable as equilibria however. When the number of leaders is given, production at subsequent periods is always prevented, and in…

Marginal costEconomics and EconometricsStrategy and ManagementEconomics Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)entry preemptionCournot competitionMicroeconomicsIndustrial relationsmedicineEconomicsStackelberg competitionProduction (economics)Free entrymedicine.symptomConstant (mathematics)endogenous timing
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